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What’s wrong with the world today?
Things just got to get better
Sho’ ain’t what the leaders say
Maybe we should write a letter
Said dear Mr. Man, we don’t understand
Why poor people keep struggling
But you don’t lend a helping hand
Matthew 5:5 say,
The meek shall inherit the Earth.
...
Who told me, Mr. Man, that working round the clock
Would buy me a big house in the hood, with cigarette ads
on every block?
Who told me, Mr. Man, that I got a right to moan?
How ‘bout this big ol’ hole in the ozone?
...
Listen, ain’t no sense in voting, same song with a different
name
Might not be in the back of the bus but it sho’ feel just the
same
Ain’t nothing fair about welfare, ain’t no assistance in aids
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Ain’t nothing affirmative about your actions till the
people get paid
Your thousand years are up, now you gotta share the land
th
Section I, the 14 Amendment says,
No state shall deprive any person of life
Liberty or property, without due process of law
Mr. Man, we want to end this letter with three words
1
We tired a-y’all
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prince’s lyrics ring true today. Although prescient in 2004,
before the recession set back the North and South Minneapolis
neighborhoods in which he grew up, Prince addressed the growing
concerns that any Legal Aid lawyer knows full well: the frustration
and anger from low-income people of color, immigrants, and
others struggling in the midst of desperate personal circumstances,
dilapidated housing conditions, and exploitative rental practices.
Housing discrimination litigation, and disparate-impact claims in
particular, have struggled to make headway on these issues.
Moreover, housing development policies have failed the
2
communities they were supposed to serve, making it difficult to
improve existing affordable housing stock and to enable families to
make real choices about where they can live.
Today, community awareness of housing conditions, rental
practices, and the historic antecedents of these conditions and
practices is especially acute. Still unclear is how to systemically
address these problems. After decades of trying to increase housing
opportunity by fighting against housing segregation, demographic
3
statistics tell us that, overall, there has been little improvement.
The Twin Cities metro area remains one of the most racially
4
segregated urban landscapes in the country. Legal Aid attorneys
also know from decades of representing minority families facing

1.
2.

PRINCE, Dear Mr. Man, on MUSICOLOGY (NPG Records 2004).
See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO
SEGREGATED?
6–7
(2015),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ed/00
/ed00c05a000fffeb881655f2e02e9f29/Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated-2-26
-15.pdf.
3. See id. at 1 (“The concentration of black families in low-income areas has
grown for over a decade; in Portland and Seattle, it has declined.”).
4. See id.
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housing discrimination that much work remains to be done in this
5
area.
One tool to combat discrimination has seen some resurgence
in recent years: the disparate-impact claim brought under the
6
federal Fair Housing Act. This claim asserts that facially neutral
policies of government- and private-sector actors have a
7
discriminatory effect on minority populations. This claim’s use
may be a particularly effective strategy in parts of the country where
much of the discriminatory activity tends to be more subterranean
than overt—more “Minnesota Nice” than in-your-face obvious.
This article discusses the development of fair-housing
disparate-impact jurisprudence and its current resurgence in the
Twin Cities. Part II sets out the types of housing discrimination
8
issues seen in a legal aid practice in the Twin Cities. Part III reviews
the development of fair-housing disparate-impact cases around the
nation and recent Housing and Urban Development rule
9
promulgation governing disparate-impact order-of-proof criteria.
Part IV discusses the trajectory of fair-housing disparate-impact
10
jurisprudence closer to home in the Eighth Circuit. Finally, Part V
assesses the current state of litigation involving disparate-impact
claims in the Twin Cities and how these claims might be used in the
11
future on behalf of Legal Aid’s client communities.

5. References to Legal Aid in this article reflect the experiences of legal aid
attorneys at Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where there has
been a separate housing discrimination unit since the mid-1990s, who represent
low-income people in central Minnesota in housing discrimination matters. This
author’s discussions with other legal aid attorneys and housing discrimination
advocates around the country, however, indicate that these experiences are not
unique to Minnesota nor the Twin Cities.
6. The Fair Housing Act is a federal law enacted as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19, 3631 (2012)). Its purpose is to provide, within
constitutional limits, fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
7. See Disparate Impact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
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II. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: WHAT LEGAL AID SEES IN THE TWIN
CITIES
Legal Aid staff face a relentless flood of housing discrimination
complaints presented by their clients. Many of these complaints
involve differential treatment based on protected class membership
that is not difficult to decode. Horrific accounts of racial and sexual
harassment, outright refusals to rent, and evictions—stemming
from discrimination based on race, national origin, and disability—
form the heart of Legal Aid’s housing discrimination practice. It
does not seem to matter whether the property is located in the
Twin Cities’ urban core or its sprawling suburban/exurban metro
area: poor people from minority communities bear the brunt of
12
discriminatory conduct in housing. And, the poorer and more
vulnerable the individual, the worse the effects of housing
discrimination. Ironically, these are the people whom our federal
and state fair-housing laws were designed to protect the most: poor,
13
often disabled, single mothers from protected classes. Indeed, one
commentator writing recently about housing instability in poor
urban neighborhoods in America summarized this situation as
reflected in the African American community: “If incarceration had
come to define the lives of men from impoverished black
neighborhoods, eviction was shaping the lives of women. Poor
black men were locked up. Poor black women [and their families]
14
were locked out.”
Less outright offensive than this sort of differential treatment,
but perhaps more insidious in perpetuating discrimination and
segregation, are facially neutral policies sometimes used by Twin
12. See generally Alex M. Johnson Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent
Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1595 (1995).
13. The purpose of the federal Fair Housing Act is to “ensure the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of impermissible characteristics.” United States v.
Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.
1981). While the Fair Housing Act only protects from discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and national origin, many
states have laws that go beyond this scope to protect against discrimination on the
basis of characteristics such as income level and marital status. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.09 (2016); see also ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 11:1 (2012).
14. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
98 (2016).
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Cities landlords and local housing authorities. Such policies result
in the very exclusion that many fair-housing laws are designed to
prevent. This includes rental policies that require tenants to have
15
clean criminal records and post income that is three times the
16
rent. They may also create policies, written or unwritten, that
result in persons with disabilities being denied housing due to
purported concerns about safety. From Legal Aid’s experience,
these policies have been difficult to combat legally and may very
well be part of the reason housing segregation in and around the
Twin Cities persists.
What can we do to meet clients’ needs and make headway
against facially neutral housing practices that continue to
perpetuate long-standing patterns of segregation? One tool may be
the recently revitalized fair-housing claim that alleges disparate
impact, a theory of liability that does not depend on proving
discriminatory intent. As this article describes, advocates’ historical
experiences with bringing these sorts of claims have been a mixed
bag, to say the least. In Legal Aid’s experience, many judges have
not been kind to these claims. Consequently, it has been difficult
for advocates practicing in this area to discern the legal standards
for the order of proof that will result in success, not to mention the
statistical presentations that would be persuasive to triers of fact or
appellate reviewers. However, developments in disparate-impact
jurisprudence and federal rulemaking have now made order-ofproof methodology much clearer. Fair-housing advocates, as a
result, can more realistically assess the prospects of using disparate
impact as an additional tool to address more systemic
manifestations of housing discrimination affecting client
communities.

15. Cf. Samuel M. Johnson, Your “Permanent Record” Under Minnesota’s
Expungement Laws: The Process and Opportunities for Change, HENNEPIN LAW.,
July/Aug. 2016, at 8, 8 n.1. (“[A]s many as one in four Minnesotans have a
criminal record . . . .”).
16. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 504B.175 (2016) (showing that Minnesota law puts no
maximum limitation on the amount a landlord may require a tenant to pay to
secure a lease).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT’S 2015 STAMP OF APPROVAL FOR FAIRHOUSING DISPARATE-IMPACT CLAIMS’ COGNIZABILITY IN TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY AFFAIRS V. INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC.
Part of the difficulty in bringing a successful disparate-impact
case under the Fair Housing Act comes from the expansive
language of the statute itself, which makes it challenging to prove
discriminatory intent. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA” or
“Fair Housing Act”) was enacted to ban various housing practices,
such as: refusing to sell or rent real property; imposing unfair terms
or conditions in a sale or tenancy; using discriminatory
advertisements or statements; misrepresenting the availability of
17
housing; “blockbusting” ; failing to provide equal housing
opportunities for persons with disabilities; and coercing,
intimidating, threatening, or interfering with the exercise of fair18
The statute’s causation language banned
housing rights.
discrimination in these substantive areas “because of” race, color,
19
national origin, religion, and sex and, in 1988, handicap and
20
familial status.
Congress did not define “because of,” although applicability of
the FHA to unfair housing practices has been fairly straightforward
21
when discriminatory intent was clear. In contrast, FHA protections
are more difficult to obtain when a landlord acts with innocent
22
motives, but his or her conduct results in discriminatory effects. In
17. “Blockbusting [is a] real estate practice in which brokers encourage
owners to list their homes for sale by exploiting fears of racial change within their
neighborhood.” Dmitri Melhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and
Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012); SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 4:4.
19. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1968) (refusal to sell or rent);
id. § 3604(b) (discrimination in terms or conditions of sale or rental); id.
§ 3604(d) (misrepresentations of housing availability); id. § 3604(f)(1) (failure to
sell or rent to persons with handicap); id. § 3604(f)(2) (discrimination against
persons with handicap in terms or conditions of sale or rental); id. § 3605(a)
(discrimination by persons in real estate business).
20. See Fair Housing Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 9(b), 102 Stat. 1622
(1988).
21. See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, § 10:1 (noting the phrase “because of”
identifies whether a housing practice is unlawful: “it would apply when the sole
reason for a defendant’s action is the race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial
status, or national origin of the person dealt with”).
22. See id.; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev., 429 U.S.
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general, courts allow fair-housing cases based on disparate-impact
claims to proceed, at least past the pleadings stage, by borrowing
from landmark Supreme Court decisions on employment
23
discrimination such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
In the past decade, housing advocates embraced the disparate
impact doctrine as a tool to target neighborhood segregation, and
the federal government developed a disparate-impact rule
recognizing disparate-impact claims under the FHA. As such, much
has transpired in disparate-impact litigation across the country in
recent years. Much of the impetus for using disparate impact as a
tool to combat residential housing segregation, particularly in the
rental market, has come from significant housing discrimination
24
cases brought in places like New Jersey and Texas. Moreover, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development has done its part
to support fair-housing enforcement by promulgating its disparate25
impact rule, which sets out the preferred order of proof for
26
disparate-impact claims. After years of uncertainty regarding the
viability of bringing disparate-impact claims under the FHA, the
Supreme Court finally settled the issue of fair-housing disparateimpact claim cognizability and the validity of the federal disparateimpact rule in 2015 in Texas Department of Housing & Community
27
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. It is necessary to explore
the development of the disparate impact doctrine before turning to
the treatment of fair-housing disparate-impact claims in the Eighth
Circuit.
252 (1977) (discussing a real estate developer who alleged that the refusal of local
officials to re-zone a housing tract from single-family to multi-family was racially
discriminatory and not simply motivated by a desire to protect property values).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See SCHWEMM, supra note 13, §§ 10:4–7, 10:29–58,
for a comprehensive examination of how housing discrimination disparate-impact
case decisions have developed since the 1960s. Recent scholarship likewise
summarizes the evolution of the Fair Housing Act, its implementation of federal
regulations, and disparate-impact jurisprudence. See, e.g., Eric W.M. Bain, Another
Missed Opportunity to Fix Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1434 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount
Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
25. See William F. Fuller, What’s HUD Got to do With it? How HUD’s Disparate
Impact Rule May Save the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2047 (2015).
26. Id.
27. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
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New Jersey Legal Aid Defends Fair-Housing Rights for Low-Income
Residents in Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Township of Mount Holly

The Mount Holly case arose out of redevelopment plans
28
hatched in 2000. The plan involved the demolition of housing
primarily occupied by poor African American and Hispanic
29
residents. Three hundred twenty-nine homes comprised of twostory solid brick buildings built in the 1950s, an adjacent
30
playground, and a community center were destroyed. Half of
31
these homes were rental properties. These homes were to be
replaced by “significantly more expensive housing units” in the
32
overall township gentrification scheme. The planning process
itself adversely impacted residents; while plan development
puttered along in fits and starts for several years, the neighborhood
33
gradually emptied out.
The resulting class action lawsuit, including disparate-impact
claims, was brought on behalf of the local low-income housing
34
rights association. The plaintiffs were represented by New Jersey
Legal Services and assisted by the AARP Foundation Litigation and
35
private counsel. The lawsuit then wended its way through state
court, and the anti-discrimination claims—which had not been ripe
36
for adjudication in state court—were refiled in federal court.
Motions to dismiss were converted into motions for summary
judgment and then dismissed; the federal district court judge
found the evidence presented no prima facie case and identified
37
no alternative course of action with lesser impact. On appeal to
the Third Circuit, the court reversed the summary judgment grant
and found that prima facie standards for proving disparate impact
had been “misapplied” in the earlier stages of litigation and all
38
reasonable inferences had not been drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 377.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 378–80.
Id.
Id. at 377.
See id. at 380–81.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 377.
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The reversal allowed the disparate-impact claims to proceed,
pendant on further development of the factual record, and
39
preserved the possibility for future remedies.
The Township filed for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court for further review of the disparate-impact claims,
which was subsequently granted on the issue of the cognizability of
40
disparate-impact claims brought under the Fair Housing Act. The
parties settled the case a few weeks before oral argument,
scheduled for early December 2013, and the Supreme Court
41
dismissed the case two days later. The parties settled mainly due to
housing advocates’ concerns about how the Fair Housing Act’s
disparate-impact liability would fare at the Supreme Court given
42
the Court’s political make-up at the time.
Although Mount Holly stopped short of Supreme Court
clarification about the feasibility of disparate-impact claims, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the
federal agency primarily responsible for enforcing the Fair Housing
Act, moved forward with its own interpretation of disparate impact.
HUD completed promulgating its discriminatory effect rulemaking
43
procedures just before certiorari was granted in Mount Holly. The
promulgation of the HUD rule, as well as other disparate-impact
litigation brought around the country, later culminated in a
44
Supreme Court decision on disparate impact.
B.

HUD Disparate-Impact Rule: Promulgated to Clarify and Standardize
Disparate-Impact Order-of-Proof Test

HUD’s new 2013 rule formalized its interpretation of
45
discriminatory effects liability under the Fair Housing Act. The

39. See id. at 387.
40. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2824, 2824 (2013) (mem.).
41. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (mem.).
42. Interview with Susan Ann Silverstein, Esq., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb.
15, 2013).
43. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100).
44. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–14 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
45. See generally Fuller, supra note 25.
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hope was that the rule would resolve minor variations on how
disparate impact was applied around the country, provide for
“consistent and predictable application of the test on a national
basis,” and offer “clarity to persons seeking housing and persons
engaged in housing transactions as to how to assess potential claims
46
involving discriminatory effects.”
The new HUD disparate-impact rule set out the long-standing
three-step burden-shifting test for establishing liability:
(1) [Complainant] has the burden of proving that a
challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a
[47]
discriminatory effect.
(2) Once [complainant] satisfies [this prima facie]
burden of proof . . . defendant has the burden of proving
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or
more [of its] substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests . . . .
(3) If . . . defendant satisfies [its] burden of proof . . .
[complainant] may still prevail upon proving that the
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests
supporting the challenged practice could be served by
48
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.
HUD assessed this allocation of the burden of proof as “the fairest
49
and most reasonable approach” to resolving claims. An added
advantage was its consistency with the discriminatory effects
standards codified by Congress for employment discrimination
50
cases, as well as criteria used for discriminatory effects in lending
51
cases under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Factually similar
claims were now treated the same way, no matter which civil rights
law governed the case, reducing confusion and promoting more

46. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,460.
47. HUD defined this as follows: “[a] practice has a discriminatory effect
where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons
or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2016).
48. Id. § 100.500(c).
49. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,473–74.
50. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k) (1972).
51. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,474.
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52

consistent decisionmaking by finders of fact. HUD’s new rule was
quickly put to the test by the Supreme Court in a very different sort
of fair-housing case—one seeking to affect the dispersal of lowincome housing funding.
C.

Housing Advocates in Dallas, Texas, Challenge Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit Allocation in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v.
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs

Dallas’s Inclusive Communities Project (“DICP”) joined the
significant disparate-impact litigation activities nationwide with its
53
2008 lawsuit against Texas state housing authorities. In its suit,
DICP challenged the allocation of tax credits to developers under
54
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) program. The
parties alleged that tax credits were disproportionately allocated to
housing projects in racially segregated, economically distressed
areas and were insufficiently allocated to white suburbs with better
55
education and employment opportunities. The case went through
bench trial proceedings, and the federal district court found that
56
plaintiffs had proved disparate impact liability.
On appeal, the state argued that burden-of-proof standards
had been incorrectly applied by the trial court; the Fifth Circuit
agreed and reversed the finding of liability on the disparate-impact
claim and remanded the case for application of order-of-proof
57
standards set out in the new HUD disparate-impact rule. On
appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari regarding the
cognizability of disparate-impact claims under the Fair Housing Act
58
and the differing order-of-proof criteria.
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the 5-4 majority, endorsed the use of disparate-impact claims in
carrying out the Fair Housing Act’s goal to increase racial
52. See id.
53. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–14 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014),
aff’d and remanded sub nom. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id. at 314–15.
56. Id. at 313–14, 321.
57. Inclusive Cmtys., 747 F.3d 275.
58. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 46 (2015) (mem.).
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integration in American society, putting a Supreme Court
59
imprimatur on HUD’s new disparate-impact rule. He noted that
disparate-impact theory “plays an important role in uncovering
discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy
60
classification as disparate treatment.”
Clearly troubled by this novel challenge to a state tax credit
allocation program, however, Justice Kennedy set out some
“cautionary standards” that should be taken into account when
61
evaluating disparate-impact claims. He opined that fair housing
enforcement should not displace “valid government policies” but
rather should more appropriately focus on the “remov[al of]
62
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” One commentator
summarized the Court’s limitations as follows:
Thus, a plaintiff’s mere showing of racial imbalance would
“not, without more, establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact,” and a plaintiff must prove a “robust”
causal connection between the defendant’s challenged
practice and any statistical disparities. Even if these
elements are shown, a defendant could still prevail by
proving that its challenged policy is “necessary to achieve
a valid interest.” Finally, with respect to the lessdiscriminatory-alternative phase of [a Fair Housing Act]
impact claim, the [Inclusive Communities] opinion
indicated agreement with HUD’s regulation that this
63
burden should be placed on the plaintiff.
Highlighting cases it believed to be worthier applications of
disparate-impact liability—such as racially exclusionary zoning
practices in predominantly white suburbs—the Court appeared
64
skeptical about the prospects for the case’s success on remand.

59. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
60. Id. at 2511–12.
61. Id. at 2524.
62. Id. at 2522, 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
63. Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities:
What’s New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 111 (2015) (quoting
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514, 2523, 2524).
64. Id. At the time, the plaintiffs’ challenge to Texas’s tax credit allocation
was a novel disparate impact challenge. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
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The majority’s concern about what sorts of fair-housing
disparate-impact cases would be brought in the wake of Inclusive
Communities was echoed and underscored by that case’s dissenting
65
justices. Indeed, Justice Alito’s sternly worded dissent (joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas) pinpointed
the “rats” he sought to avoid on behalf of impoverished
66
communities everywhere. Interestingly enough, the case that
apparently fueled Justice Alito’s ire was one that emanated from
the Eighth Circuit, Gallagher v. Magner, which involved a challenge
to St. Paul’s housing code enforcement program brought by
adversely affected local landlords on behalf of their poor and
67
minority tenants. A theory of liability that could produce a case
like Gallagher (discussed in the next section), was, to Justice Alito, a
blanket reason to deny disparate-impact liability to all aspiring
litigants: “Something has gone badly awry when a city can’t even
68
make slumlords kill rats without fear of a lawsuit.”
Amongst discussion of how disparate-impact liability would
now fare at the Supreme Court and speculation about how HUD
might react in the wake of Inclusive Communities, fair-housing
practitioners are left somewhere in the middle. On the positive
side, no longer do any precious litigation resources need to be
spent arguing the basic validity of disparate-impact claims under
the Fair Housing Act. Less certain, however, is how disparateimpact litigation will fare for the more creative disparate impact
theories of liability that have been put to use in recent years,
particularly when applied to challenge various kinds of
government-sponsored low-income housing programs. In the
Eighth Circuit, the overall amount of jurisprudence analyzing fairhousing disparate-impact claims is relatively small. However,
enough can be extracted to give fair-housing practitioners a sense
of how various kinds of cases will fare going forward.

65. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2532
(Alito, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing a Minnesota federal district court
case in which landlords who sought to exterminate their buildings of rats were
sued under a theory of disparate impact) (“No one wants to live in a rat’s nest.”).
67. See 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010).
68. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE TRAJECTORY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF DISPARATE-IMPACT LITIGATION AND ITS JUDICIAL
TREATMENT IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT: PAST AND PRESENT
The Eighth Circuit is no stranger to lawsuits brought by publicinterest housing advocates addressing the age-old problem of
housing segregation within its regional confines. This Part will
discuss the development of disparate-impact lawsuits brought
under the Fair Housing Act from the early 1970s to the present day
and how the Supreme Court has evolved in developing doctrine
and criteria for analyzing claims in this area. This Part will
conclude with how this jurisprudence may be affected by the new
HUD rule and the Supreme Court’s warnings regarding future
disparate-impact liability under the Fair Housing Act in Inclusive
Communities.
A.

1974: United States v. City of Black Jack

The most notable example of disparate-impact jurisprudence’s
69
long history in the Eighth Circuit is Judge Heaney’s thoughtful
70
and resolute opinion in 1974. This opinion reversed a Missouri
federal judge’s dismissal of fair-housing disparate-impact claims in
71
United States v. City of Black Jack. Given the racially divided times we
live in, it is worth spending time to lay out the factual
circumstances giving rise to the case. The City of Black Jack is a
first-ring suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. This is a region of the
country where deeply entrenched patterns of housing segregation
72
and acute racial tensions continue to this day. In the late 1960s,
one proposed solution to these problems was a planned housing
73
development in an area previously governed by St. Louis County.
69. In 1991, I had the honor of getting to know Judge Heaney, who had
given over his visiting chambers in St. Paul to the newly appointed Judge Loken
and his staff. As a member of Judge Loken’s staff, I spent a fair amount of time
with Judge Heaney himself in those first few months; my memories of him include
his warmth and gentle wit, and unfailing graciousness to all.
70. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), reh’g
denied, (1975).
71. Id.
72. See Daniel Marans, Why Missouri Has Become the Heart of Racial Tension In
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
16,
2015,
1:04
PM),
America,
THE
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-mizzou-missouri-racial-tension
_us_564736e2e4b08cda3488f34d.
73. See City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1182.
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The county adopted a master plan for municipal development in
74
this area in 1965. By 1970, the area was still largely undeveloped
75
and remained focused on single-family homes.
In 1969, the Inter Religious Center for Urban Affairs (ICUA)
entered the picture when it began planning “alternative housing
opportunities for persons of low and moderate income living in the
76
ghetto areas of St. Louis.” ICUA’s foray into the City of Black Jack
came in the form of a federally subsidized 108-unit townhouse
development in a previously unsettled part of the municipality
77
called “Park View Heights.” Predictably, surrounding white
communities mounted a “swift and active” opposition to the
78
project. Despite HUD’s green light for project funding, local
opposition coalesced in petitions to the St. Louis County Council
that resulted in an abrupt scuttling of the project and a city
79
ordinance that prohibited multiple-family dwellings in the area.
HUD struck back with a lawsuit claiming the city ordinance
violated the recently enacted Fair Housing Act and asserted racebased claims of illegal housing discrimination under both
80
differential treatment and disparate-impact theories. The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri allowed the
claims past the pleading stage but dismissed the case and found
81
that no violation had been proven under either theory of liability.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit judges sitting on the panel were
82
Judges Heaney, Bright, and Ross. In a unanimous decision, the
court reversed the dismissal and allowed the case to go forward
83
under a disparate-impact theory of liability. The Eighth Circuit’s
ruling would stand, as the Supreme Court denied the subsequent
84
petition for certiorari.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1182, 1186–87.
79. Id. at 1183.
80. United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
81. Id. at 327.
82. Id.
83. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom. City of Blackjack v. United States, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (mem.),
reh’g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (mem.).
84. City of Blackjack, 422 U.S. 1042.
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Writing for the panel, Judge Heaney identified the particular
demographic statistics that could be used to prove liability and put
the statistics into historical context:
The [district court’s] conclusion [finding no statistical
proof of discriminatory effect from the city ordinance]
was in error . . . . The ultimate effect of the ordinance was
to foreclose 85 percent of the blacks living in the
metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack,
and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them
were living in substandard or overcrowded units.
The discriminatory effect of the ordinance is more
onerous when assessed in light of the fact that segregated
housing in the St. Louis metropolitan area was . . . in large
measure the result of deliberate racial discrimination in
the housing market by the real estate industry and by
85
agencies of the federal, state, and local governments.
Judge Heaney went on to outline the correct order of proof to
be followed on remand, starting with the requirements for a
86
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case :
[First,] [t]o establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that
the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably
results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has
a discriminatory effect. . . . Effect, and not motivation, is
the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily
conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because
whatever our law was once, . . . we now firmly recognize
that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
[87]
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.
[Second,] [o]nce the [prima facie case is established],
the burden shifts to the governmental defendant to
demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a
88
compelling governmental interest.
The court then determines whether any of these justifications
rise to such a level by examining several factors:
85. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186 (internal citations omitted) (quoting
City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. at 326) (quoting the district court opinion’s factual
findings, stipulated to by the parties, regarding discriminatory intent against poor
urban minorities moving out to the country).
86. Id. at 1184.
87. Id. at 1184–85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
88. Id.
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[F]irst, whether the ordinance in fact furthers the
governmental interest asserted; second, whether the
public interest served by the ordinance is constitutionally
permissible and is substantial enough to outweigh the
private detriment caused by it; and third, whether less
drastic means are available whereby the stated
89
governmental interest may be attained.
Judge Heaney found the district court’s discriminatory effect
analysis lacking and pointed out that claims asserted in the lawsuit
by the City defendant were based on incorrect information that the
proposed development would impede traffic, overcrowd local
90
schools, and devalue homes. He was similarly unimpressed by
other reasons advanced by the defendants and noted the lack of
substance in the evidence proffered by defendants, both
91
quantitative and qualitative. The result was a remand to the
district court “with instructions . . . to enter a permanent
92
injunction . . . enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance.”
City of Black Jack is significant for its early endorsement of the
disparate-impact burden-shifting test, which closely mirrored the
93
discriminatory effects rule formalized by HUD twenty years later.
Moreover, the resulting victory for the forces of racial housing
integration and development of decent, affordable housing for lowincome persons was all the more meaningful because it took place
in the nation’s heartland; this, after all, was the same part of the
country from which emanated the infamous Dred Scott decision
94
more than a hundred years before.
B.

2005: Eighth Circuit Preserves Low-Income Housing in Charleston
Housing Authority v. USDA and Ventura Village, Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis

Years after City of Black Jack, disparate-impact litigation in this
region continued to focus on challenges to the development of
federally funded low-income housing. Two fair-housing cases
featuring disparate-impact claims were heard by the Eighth Circuit

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1187.
Id.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2013).
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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in 2005 and resulted in preservation of housing for communities of
95
racial minorities.
1.

Public Housing Preserved in Charleston Housing Authority v.
USDA

In the late 1990s housing advocates in this region addressed
the difficult problem of public housing redevelopment in
Charleston, Missouri. A tiny town of about 5900, Charleston tips
96
the Mississippi delta at the far southeastern corner of the state.
There, the local housing authority had adopted a policy of “poverty
97
deconcentration.” The public housing at issue was a Section 8
building complex of fifty rental units in a cluster of twenty-two
98
separate buildings. The plan was for some of these units to be
demolished; forty-six of the forty-seven occupied units were
99
occupied by African American tenants.
The resulting litigation featured most of the local and federal
stakeholders in the project. One of the lawsuits was brought by the
tenants and a local nonprofit to save the project and alleged
100
disparate-impact claims, among other things. At trial, the court
found for the tenants on the merits, enjoined the demolition, and
found Fair Housing Act disparate-impact violations based on
101
race. On appeal, Judge Melloy wrote for the panel and affirmed
102
the district court’s decision. The court found that plaintiffs met
their prima facie burden by demonstrating that “the objected-to
action results in, or can be predicted to result in, a disparate impact
upon a protected class compared to a relevant population as a
103
whole.” Reviewing the evidentiary record, Judge Melloy noted
95. See infra notes 97, 110.
96. CITY OF CHARLESTON, www.charlestonmo.us (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
97. Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 2005).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 734.
101. Id. at 736. Interestingly, the district court also found no evidence showing
that the housing authority considered the impact of its planned action on its
overwhelmingly African American tenant population, which was contrary to
provisions of a governing statute enacted after the origination of the loans, 1987’s
Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1472(c). Id.
Coupled with the disparate-impact finding, the court concluded that the housing
authority had failed to “affirmatively further fair housing.” Id.
102. Id. at 733–34.
103. Id. at 740–41.
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that no matter which relevant population was used as a
comparison, the statistics presented proved the disparate impact:
“[Plaintiff’s] proof established a disproportionate impact upon
minority class members whether we examine the relevant waiting
list population, the income-eligible population, or the actual
104
[project tenants].”
Shifting the burden to the housing authority’s
deconcentration policy justification, Judge Melloy agreed with the
district court that the policy objectives were unsupported by the
105
evidence presented and therefore pretextual. As a matter of fact,
the housing authority overstated the number of low-income rental
106
units located in the project area. Crime statistics and the success
of various anti-drug initiatives implemented over the years showed
107
no actual concentration of criminal activity or drug use. Housing
authority records showed the project to be financially stable with
“multiple sources of untapped funding” for needed
108
improvements. Judge Melloy carefully noted that it had not been
the “general goal of deconcentration” that had been challenged.
Rather, in this instance the statistics showed a loss of affordable
housing borne almost only by African Americans. The housing
authority failed to show an actual need for deconcentration and in
109
fact had “falsely represented” the facts in its attempt to do so.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Charleston Housing Authority
provided fair-housing advocates with valuable insights about the
use of statistics in meeting prima facie disparate-impact criteria. It
specifically endorsed the plaintiffs’ use of statistics to demonstrate
the disproportionate impact of new policies on the racial minorities
making up the vast majority of that housing’s tenant population. It
also identified various relevant populations that could be
considered in determining the disparate impact. The decision was
also helpful to housing advocates who bring similar claims and
refuse to accept a deconcentration policy that is pretextual and
unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, Charleston Housing Authority
should serve as a blueprint for proving disparate impact in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 742.
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situations involving destruction of existing low-income housing
properties.
2.

Neighborhood Opposition to Supportive Housing for the Disabled
Defeated in Ventura Village, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis

Also in 2005, the Eighth Circuit was called to resolve a
Minneapolis neighborhood clash over city approval of publiclyfunded housing for the disabled. Project for Pride in Living, a local
housing developer long known for its strong voice in the fight for
low-income housing, proposed a 20-unit, 128-person supportive
110
housing facility in south-central Minneapolis. This location was
and is at the heart of the city’s south-side African American
111
population. The purpose of the housing development was to
provide much needed permanent housing and rehabilitative
services for homeless families with disabled members, including
112
those with mental illness and substance abuse problems. The
developer applied for and was granted a conditional use permit
allowing the development, which was required because local zoning
rules prohibited spacing of such supportive housing facilities too
113
close to each other. The local neighborhood association objected
114
to another such facility and sued under the Fair Housing Act.
The lawsuit claimed that the city’s approval of the permit was illegal
housing discrimination because its waiver policy had the effect of
concentrating supportive housing in a small number of densely
populated urban neighborhoods and therefore perpetuated
115
segregation of minorities and the disabled. The claims did not
find favor with the district court, which dismissed the action on
summary judgment; the neighborhood association appealed, to no
116
avail.
In affirming the district court’s decision, Judge Loken wrote
for a panel that included Judge Riley and Judge Smith. The
110. Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 419 F.3d 725, 726 (8th Cir.
2005).
COMPASS,
111. See
Ventura
Village
Neighborhood,
MINN.
http://www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/minneapolis/ventura
-village (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
112. Ventura Vill., 419 F3d at 727.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 726–27.
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neighborhood association did not present sufficient evidence to
prove discriminatory enforcement of the city’s spacing
117
ordinance. The city approved every application for supportive
housing developments in the previous ten years and more than half
had been located in majority white neighborhoods, which resulted
118
in no actual increased concentration of minority segregation.
Rather, Judge Loken wryly noted, “the City has taken a single raceneutral action—the grant of a waiver of its spacing requirement—
that permitted the creation of additional supportive housing and
thereby increased the housing available to eligible handicapped
119
persons.” Judge Loken went on to note the absence of case law
authority upholding fair-housing liability in instances where
additional housing was created “absent proof that the action was
part of a discriminatory policy or practice of refusing to approve
120
other housing.” Judge Loken then concluded that even if the
city’s “liberal” waiver policy had increased the concentration of
supportive housing, “the concentration is attributable to the
independent siting decisions of private housing providers . . . not to
any City action ‘making unavailable’ or ‘denying’ housing
121
opportunities on the basis of race or disability.”
Despite the pro-low-income housing outcome of Ventura
Village, it cannot be viewed as encouragement to disparate-impact
theories of liability, particularly when applied to allegations that a
certain housing policy increases minority population concentration
in urban areas and perpetuates segregation. Rather, it underscores
the importance of developing an evidentiary record clearly showing
a causal connection between the housing policy complained of and
any consequent disparate impact.
C.

2010: Disparate-Impact Claims Rescued in Gallagher v. Magner

The Twin Cities were again the locus of low-income housing
controversy amid the rather unconventional fair-housing disparate122
impact claims brought in Gallagher v. Magner. Saint Paul landlords
banded together to challenge what they considered to be the city’s

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010).
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123

aggressive enforcement of its housing code. They brought a
cluster of lawsuits that were consolidated and heard by the federal
124
district court. The landlord plaintiffs contended that the city was
enforcing its housing code more aggressively against their
properties because of the disproportionately high concentration of
racial minorities in their tenant population, and, even if no specific
discriminatory animus was present, this had an illegal disparate
125
impact and perpetuated racial segregation in Saint Paul. In
opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
apparently showered the beleaguered district court with
126
The court
“voluminous materials—four file boxes worth.”
127
responded by granting summary judgment, dismissing all claims.
The inevitable appeal met a similar fate, except for the disparateimpact claim, which the Eighth Circuit panel reversed and
128
remanded.
Writing for the panel, Judge Melloy held that the district
court’s interpretation of the facially benign policy or practice at
129
work in the city’s code enforcement scheme was too narrow. The
court defined the plaintiff’s prima facie burden as requiring a
showing that “a facially neutral policy ha[d] a significant adverse
130
impact on members of a protected minority group.” Importantly,
the city action at issue was not a city code coming into conflict with
131
federal housing quality standards. Rather, the challenged action
was the city’s enforcement of the housing code along with
numerous allegations, supported by record evidence, that the city
had played fast and loose with the rules, issued code violations that
were false, and punished property owners without prior
132
notification or opportunity to remedy problems.
The court
123. Id. at 824.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 832 (quoting Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987,
1020 (D. Minn. 2008)) (noting the district court’s “frustration” that plaintiffs had
“failed to ‘winnow out the relevant documents,’” and therefore “the burden of
doing so fell to the Court”).
127. Id. at 823.
128. Id. at 823. The panel consisted of Judges Wollman, Bye, and Melloy. Id.
129. Id. at 832.
130. Id. at 833 (quoting Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871,
883 (8th Cir. 2003)).
131. Id. at 834.
132. Id.
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concluded that the evidence, at least at the summary judgment
stage, sufficiently demonstrated disparate impact, specifically
evidence of: (1) a shortage of affordable housing caused by the
enforcement scheme; (2) the parties’ stipulation that African
Americans made up a disproportionate percentage of households
relying on federally subsidized low-income housing in the city; and
(3) increased costs to property owners from housing code
133
enforcement. All of this had, as a matter of fact, resulted in an
actual loss of affordable housing in the city, as shown by
government records predicting a consequent loss of affordable
housing and a nearly 300% increase in vacant housing in Saint Paul
134
in 2003–2007. In so protecting the disparate-impact theory of
liability asserted by the plaintiff landlords, Judge Melloy
acknowledged the lack of evidence “connect[ing] the dots of . . .
[the] claim” but explained that “[w]here a plaintiff demonstrates
that a protected group depends on low-income housing to a
greater extent than the non-protected population, other courts
have found it reasonable to infer that the non-protected group will
experience a disproportionate adverse effect from a policy or
135
decision that reduces low-income housing.” In other words, the
key to establishing a challenged policy’s disparate impact through
comparing levels of dependence on affordable housing by different
classes of people was to show that the net result of the policy
actually resulted in reduced low-income housing. This was a boon
to any litigant seeking to preserve low-income housing
opportunities through court action.
Moving through the rest of the disparate-impact burdenshifting analysis, the court quickly ratified the rather obvious
relationship of the code enforcement scheme to the legitimate,
non-discriminatory objectives of habitable, safe, and livable
136
The burden then fell back on the plaintiff
neighborhoods.
landlords to offer a viable alternative that satisfied the city’s
legitimate policy objectives while reducing the discriminatory
137
impact of the challenged enforcement practices. The plaintiffs
identified previous, gentler code enforcement programs used by
the city that they preferred, and this was apparently enough for
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 834–35.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id.
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138

Judge Melloy and the Eighth Circuit panel. The old programs
were more collaborative in nature and had reportedly been
effective enough—conclusions corroborated by record evidence of
statements from a cross section of stakeholders and the city’s
failure to show that the discarded enforcement scheme was costlier
139
or would fail to accomplish its policy objectives. Judge Melloy’s
opinion concluded that disputed issues of fact existed that the old
code enforcement program “generated a cooperative relationship
with property owners, achieved greater code compliance, and
resulted in less financial burdens on rental property owners,” and
that “[i]t was reasonable to infer from these facts . . . that [the old
code enforcement program] would significantly reduce the impact
140
on protected class members.”
Issuing the Gallagher decision and remanding for further
proceedings on the disparate-impact claim did not, unfortunately,
141
resolve the case, which is still pending. The disparate-impact
claim preserved by the Eighth Circuit was reportedly stayed
142
pending the Inclusive Communities decision; the case presently
143
awaits further disposition with the district court.
After Gallagher and the Supreme Court’s criticism of Gallagher’s
disparate-impact claims in Inclusive Communities, it is difficult to
envision a case like Gallagher succeeding today. Indeed, a
subsequent lawsuit alleging similar disparate-impact claims—this
time against the City of Minneapolis and its alleged heightened
enforcement of housing inspection policies—was met with less
judicial tolerance and failed to meet Inclusive Communities’ stricter

138. Id. at 837–38.
139. Id. at 838.
140. Id.
141. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
2010).
142. Id. The docket for the case (No. 04-cv-02632 in the Federal District Court
of Minnesota) reads on January 30, 2015: “The case is stayed until the related
Supreme Court Decision is released. A trial date will be determined in the future
by Chief Judge Davis.”
143. See Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380, 381 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying
appellant’s petition for a hearing en banc). The dissent in the case noted that
whether “application of disparate-impact analysis to a city’s aggressive housing
code enforcement is dictated by the purpose of the FHA is an important question
of first impression.” Id. at 384 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
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144

causality standards for pleading disparate impact. In Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, landlords (represented by the same law firm involved
in the Gallagher case) with fourteen rental dwellings (comprising a
total of thirty-five units) in inner-city Minneapolis alleged that the
City’s rental dwelling license scheme and its heightened standards
displaced protected class families, which resulted in disparate
145
impact. In dismissing the case on the pleadings, the federal
district court cited Inclusive Communities’ “robust causality
requirement” that plaintiffs must point to a defendant’s policy and
the purported disparity to allege facts showing a causal
146
connection. The plaintiffs’ failure to allege that any tenant was
displaced or that rental licenses were lost due to anything other
than actual code violations at their properties did not meet
disparate-impact prima facie causation requirements after Inclusive
147
Communities.
Accordingly, though feasibility of disparate-impact liability as a
general matter is no longer in dispute, fair-housing advocates
should carefully consider these judicial admonitions when
considering which disparate-impact lawsuits are deserving of scarce
litigation resources. The HUD disparate-impact rule, along with the
added imprimatur of the Inclusive Communities decision, sets out
basic rules of the road that all should now be able to follow. Still,
advocates and courts will continue to struggle with defining where
the boundary lies between upholding valid disparate-impact claims
and the overregulation of actors attempting to navigate in good
faith through an increasingly complex community housing
landscape.
D.

Statistical Proof of Disparate-Impact Claims Fails in Keller v. City of
Fremont

More recently, the defeat of disparate-impact claims by the
Eighth Circuit in Keller v. City of Fremont illustrates the perils of
inadequate statistical presentation and analysis, as well as failure to
148
correctly define the relevant comparison population. In 2013,

144. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045, 2016 WL 1222227 (D. Minn.
Mar. 28, 2016).
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *11.
147. Id.
148. 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013).
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fair-housing disparate-impact litigation in this region involved the
expression of virulent anti-immigrant sentiment in Fremont,
Nebraska, a city of about 26,000 on the Platte River just west of
149
Omaha. Voters there adopted a city ordinance that limited hiring
and providing rental housing to “illegal aliens” and “unauthorized
150
aliens.” Preceding the ordinance was a tripling of the city’s
Hispanic population over a ten-year period, from 4.3% to 11.9% of
151
the overall city population.
Some of the less savory aspects of the ordinance involved the
absolute prohibition on renting to “illegal aliens” and the
consequent requirement that any prospective adult renter register
with city authorities by obtaining (and paying for) an occupancy
152
license from the city. The licensure process included submission
153
of proof of immigration status. Subsequent discovery of a renter’s
unlawful immigration status would, in and of itself, breach the
154
lease. Other enforcement mechanisms included cumbersome
immigration verification processes to be done by police officers and
155
a $100 fine to landlords, per day, per violation.
Various individuals and entities allied against this measure,
including a local union and the ACLU, by filing suit immediately;
the collective parties challenged the ordinance on its face as
unconstitutional, pre-empted by federal immigration laws, and
156
discriminatory under the Fair Housing Act. Chief Judge Laurie
Camp heard the case on cross motions for summary judgment and
157
found fair-housing violations. Both sides appealed this decision
and the Eighth Circuit panel hearing the case (Judges Loken,
158
Bright, and Colloton) reversed the fair-housing ruling.
Writing for the majority, with Judge Bright dissenting, Judge
Loken’s primary complaint about the fair-housing disparate-impact
claims focused on how the relevant demographic statistics had
149. Fremont Area Chamber of Commerce, History: Community Overview,
VILLAGEPROFILE.COM
10,
12
(2012),
https://issuu.com/villageprofile/docs/fremont_ne.
150. Keller, 719 F.3d at 937.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 938.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 937.
157. Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 982–83 (D. Neb. 2012).
158. Keller, 719 F.3d at 951.
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been presented to the district court. He concluded that what had
been put into evidence did not meet long-standing Eighth Circuit
order-of-proof standards. Specifically, plaintiffs had failed to even
meet their prima facie burden:
In this circuit, to prove a disparate-impact violation of the
FHA, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case, that
is, “that the objected-to action results in, or can be
predicted to result in, a disparate impact upon a
protected class compared to a relevant population as a
160
whole.”
The identified protected class was Latinos, but no
corresponding “specific disparate impact” had been identified;
“simply referring to the likelihood ‘that enforcing the Ordinance
would result in a reduction of the Hispanic population in
161
Fremont’” was not enough. The other end of the comparison was
similarly lacking: plaintiffs had apparently made “no attempt to
identify the ‘relevant population’ to be compared, other than citing
statistics showing that a large number of the City’s foreign-born
162
population came from Latin American countries.” Judge Loken
then queried, “Is the relevant comparison the Ordinance’s impact
on all aliens not lawfully present, on all aliens, on all renters, or on
the City’s entire population? [Plaintiffs] do not tell us, and their
163
conclusory analysis of the issue provides no answer.”
When examined in light of the Fair Housing Act’s history and
mandate to reduce segregation (primarily racial in nature), Judge
Loken was reluctant to impose disparate-impact liability in a
situation where individuals of a certain legal status (undocumented
immigrants) were the target of an adverse action and not a specific
racial or ethnic group. A disparate-impact claim solely “based on
the effect an otherwise lawful ordinance may have on a sub-group
of the unprotected class of aliens not lawfully present in this
164
country,” was accordingly, in a word, “unsound.”
159. Id.
160. Id. at 948 (citing Charleston Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729, 740–41
(8th Cir. 2005)).
161. Id. at 949.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 949. Judge Loken went on to examine the second and third steps in
a disparate-impact order-of-proof analysis and found his determination on the
prima facie issue “reinforced.” Id. “[C]ities and municipalities may have both a
legitimate local interest in restricting the number of unlawfully present aliens
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After Keller, how can practitioners in this Circuit use disparateimpact claims to protect clients from such anti-immigrant policies,
which are perhaps only proxies for race? Would it have made a
difference if plaintiffs presented statistics accounting for which
foreign-born Latinos were living in Fremont legally and which were
not? What if plaintiffs had shown that these particular Latinos,
born elsewhere (as opposed to the large and growing Latino
population living here for generations, in some cases well before
whites), were residing in Fremont legally but were adversely
impacted by the rental ordinance nonetheless?
It may be that scenarios with this sort of factual and historical
complexity are not the best fit for the blunter tool of disparateimpact theories of liability. This is doubly so when some of the
measures taken are consistent with other areas of federal law,
however anathema to political progressives. Accordingly, housing
advocates will likely benefit from a more thorough examination of
possible consequences before going down the disparate-impact
path, especially when the case is one of first impression.
V. DISPARATE IMPACT TODAY IN THE TWIN CITIES
A.

Crossroads: Disparate-Impact Claims Proceed Against Private Owners
of Affordable Housing in Richfield

This year, the Minnesota federal district court denied a
defendant apartment owner’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fairhousing claims in Crossroads Residents Organized for Stable & Secure
165
Residencies v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC. The class action
lawsuit alleged, among other things, disparate-impact claims under
the Fair Housing Act arising out of the new owners’ efforts to
gentrify rental housing that had previously been a mainstay for
166
affordable housing in the metro area. Located in the first-ring
suburb of Richfield, just south of Minneapolis, the apartment
complex had 698 lower-rent units housing more than 2200

residing within their borders and a rational basis for enforcing a particular
restriction.” Id. Furthermore, plaintiffs identified no viable alternative means of
carrying out this purpose that would not have the same discriminatory effect on
“the portion of unlawfully present aliens who are Latino.” Id.
165. No. 16-cv-233, 2016 WL 3661146, at *1 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016).
166. Cf. id. at *2–4 (the new owners planned to update each unit’s kitchen
and add new amenities in the common areas).
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residents and was described as “perhaps the largest source of
unsubsidized affordable rental housing in the Twin Cities
168
The tenant population there had historically been
Region.”
“generally lower income, with a significant number of ethnic
169
minority or disabled tenants.”
The tenants and advocacy organization that brought the case
alleged that the new owners, after purchasing the property in 2015,
required tenants to apply for new leases to remain in their
170
homes. Shortly after, they dramatically raised rents and adopted
exclusionary occupancy policies such as screening criteria
171
requiring high credit scores and income three times the rent.
Section 8 vouchers were no longer accepted, and the combination
of the higher rents and new screening criteria effectively precluded
the continued residency of any tenant receiving disability-related
172
housing funding support. All this, plaintiffs claimed, adversely
impacted racial minorities and disabled tenants, forcing them out
173
of their homes. Further, the change “offset virtually all of the
production on new affordable housing in the Metro area in 2014,”
174
thereby setting back affordable housing production efforts.
In denying the new owners’ motion to dismiss the fair-housing
disparate-impact claim, Judge Montgomery looked to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, as well as the HUD
disparate-impact rule, “[finding] enough factual allegations [in
plaintiffs’ Complaint] to support an inference” that statistical
175
analysis would show disparate impact. Specific allegations that
showed a plausible claim of disparate impact included allegations:
that approximately 35 tenants relied on Section 8
vouchers and 100 tenants relied on GRH vouchers; that
many if not most of these tenants belong to one or more
protected classes; and that Defendants’ policies will force
all of these tenants to relocate. More generally, Plaintiffs
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id. at *1 (quoting plaintiffs’ Complaint).
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Press Release, Hous. Justice Cent., U.S. District Court Denies Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Claims Against New Owners of
Crossroads Apartments in Richfield (June 6, 2016) (on file with author).
175. Crossroads, 2016 WL 3661146 at *6–7.
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allege that protected class members are overrepresented
at the complex as compared to the surrounding area; that
a high percentage of protected class members in the Twin
Cities are low-income renters; and that Defendants’ new
rents and rental criteria pose a high hurdle for low176
income renters.
The success of the Crossroads case in surviving past the
pleadings stage shows the continuing viability of the disparateimpact tool in this jurisdiction for preservation of affordable
housing, especially when the demographic statistics of affected
177
tenant populations are so striking. It is not unusual for minority
tenants facing the brunt of redevelopment activities to approach
178
legal aid offices for assistance in these situations. Fair-housing
advocates can now respond with the heightened prospect of time
consuming and expensive disparate-impact litigation in urging
housing developers to keep the interests of low-income minority
tenants in mind as they engage in gentrification efforts. This will
hopefully spur more just and equitable community development
efforts in the future.
B.

The MICAH HUD Complaints: Twin Cities Nonprofit and Suburbs
Challenge LIHTC Funding Allocation in HUD Complaints Alleging
Claims of Disparate Impact/Failure to Affirmatively Further Fair
Housing

One aspect of the current landscape in disparate-impact
litigation in the Upper Midwest involves the allocation of federal
LIHTC funds around the Twin Cities, which some in the fairhousing movement believe has intensified concentration of
housing segregation into low-income, low-opportunity areas in the
179
inner city. The argument is that not only does federal fairhousing law require that allocation of scarce housing funding be

176. Id. (internal citations omitted).
177. Rigel C. Oliveri, Disparate Impact and Integration: With TDHCA v. Inclusive
Communities the Supreme Court Retains an Uneasy Status Quo, 24 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 267 (2015).
178. Id.
179. See Shannon Prather, Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center Accuse State of FairHousing Violations, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (Sept. 20, 2014, 10:22 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/brooklyn-park-brooklyn-center-accuse-state-of-fair
-housing-violations/275901391/.
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done in a non-discriminatory manner, it must also affirmatively
180
further fair housing.
As part of the local Twin Cities fair-housing movement,
Michael Allen of Relman of Dane & Colfax in Washington, D.C.,
teamed up with Myron Orfield of the University of Minnesota Law
181
School’s Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity. Together, they
filed two complaints with HUD on behalf of various community
nonprofit stakeholders: one in November 2014 (the “November
182
Complaint”) and the other a few months later, in March 2015
183
(the “March Complaint”). The November Complaint, which was
successfully conciliated by HUD before commencement of any
investigatory activities, was brought on behalf of the Metropolitan
Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing (“MICAH”) and the
184
cities of Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, and Richfield.
The November Complaint alleged discrimination by the
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency and the Metropolitan Council
of the Twin Cities (the “Met Council”) based on race and/or
national origin through the administration of federally funded
housing and community development programs, as well as LIHTC
185
The complaint set out statistics for
program tax credits.
demographic changes in Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, and
Richfield showing dramatically increased racial segregation and
186
poverty. This, they alleged, disparately impacted nonwhites and
180. See Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment
and the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539
(2014).
181. Housing Discrimination Complaint, Metro. Interfaith Council on
Affordable Hous. v. Minnesota (Nov. 15, 2014), https://dk-media
.s3.amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micahorg/downloads/292213/Complaint_Final
_Filed_2014_11_10.pdf [hereinafter “The November Complaint”].
182. See id.
183. Housing Discrimination Complaint, Metro. Interfaith Council on
Affordable Hous. v. City of Minneapolis (Mar. 30, 2015), http://dk-media
.s3.amazonaws.com/AA/AV/micahorg/downloads/294541/MICAH_Complaint
_to_HUD_-_Mpls._and_St._Paul_filed_March_30__2015.pdf [hereinafter “The
March Complaint”].
184. Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center are two cities located to the north
and northwest of one of Minneapolis’s historic African American neighborhoods:
North Minneapolis. Richfield is directly south of Minneapolis’s Southside
neighborhoods, similarly segregated by race and home to many in the Twin Cities’
Somali community.
185. The November Complaint, supra note 181, at 2–9.
186. Id. at 3–4.
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Hispanics and violated obligations, as recipients of federal lowincome housing funds, “to take affirmative steps to overcome
187
impediments to fair-housing choice.” Targeted for particular
approbation was the regional analysis of fair-housing impediments,
which most local housing advocates had long criticized as grossly
188
inadequate.
The HUD-mediated conciliation proceedings resulted in
agreement on a process to better understand Twin Cities metro
low-income housing needs as a geographic whole, which would
presumably lead to a fair and balanced allocation of federal
housing funding dollars between urban and suburban recipients.
Terms of the settlement included funding from HUD to add an
addendum to the regional analysis of fair-housing impediments
addressing the requirement that the cities specifically examine
issues raised in the complaint, including: “how the region
distributes its affordable housing; whether the way the region
distributes low-income housing tax credits ‘reinforces existing
racial or ethnic concentrations of poverty or perpetuates racial or
ethnic segregation’; whether zoning codes reinforce existing
concentrations; and how the region’s other housing policies
189
reinforce those concentrations.”
The March Complaint, submitted by MICAH and three
Minneapolis neighborhood associations, contained similar
allegations that low-income housing funding was overly
190
concentrated in poor inner city areas. One statistical finding in
this second complaint was that in high-minority census tracts in
Minneapolis there was an average of one affordable housing unit
for every block, while in low-minority tracts there was one
191
affordable housing unit every 6.5 miles. At last report, the March
Complaint is still pending and HUD is actively investigating its
192
allegations. The parties have met face-to-face twice, and housing

187. Id. at 2–4.
188. Id.
189. Peter Callaghan, Settlement Could Alter How Affordable Housing is Built
(May
13,
2016),
Throughout
Twin
Cities
Metro,
MINNPOST
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/settlement-could-alter-how
-affordable-housing-built-throughout-twin-cities-m.
190. See The March Complaint, supra note 183, at 3.
191. Id. at 5.
192. Interview with Michael Allen, Esq., Relman, Dane & Colfax PLLC (July 8,
2016).
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advocates hope that HUD is taking the matter seriously enough to
193
The complainants’
move things forward toward conciliation.
endgame is to use the updated regional analysis of impediments to
inform decisions about housing funding allocation, which, in turn,
194
should lead to better outcomes for residents. It is their belief that
a more ideal balance of low-income housing dollars between urban
and suburban locations would be in line with historical funding
patterns from the 1970s and 1980s when state and local housing
funding decision makers considered community preferences for
housing and educational infrastructure in a more genuine
195
manner.
Meanwhile, a nineteen-member advisory committee has
convened and is meeting regularly to advise the Fair Housing
Implementation Council on the process of amending the regional
196
analysis of impediments. The Council includes stakeholders from
around the region, including the city manager of Brooklyn Park,
the mayor of Richfield, neighborhood association representatives,
197
and Legal Aid. Some of the housing advocates participating in
these proceedings have a different view of where funding allocation
should end up, believing that the 60%-40% urban-suburban split
198
stated by the MICAH complainants is, in fact, closer to 50%-50%.
Some offer a different perspective altogether on the tax credit
allocation issue, arguing that housing funding resources ought not
be taken away from inner-city communities but should rather be
used to build or preserve affordable, safe housing to improve places
199
where people already live. Commentators urge that the focus in
updating the regional analysis of impediments should be on the
kind of robust community engagement that will truly inform how
funding allocations will actually affect impoverished communities,

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Interview with Lael Robertson, Esq., Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid (July 15,
2016).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See generally Thomas B. Edsall, Where Should a Poor Family Live?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/where-should-a
-poor-family-live.html?_r=0 (“[P]reservation of existing affordable housing and
reinvestment in distressed or gentrifying neighborhoods must be considered as
valid strategies equal to mobility and moving to high opportunity areas.”).
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as well as on including enforcement mechanisms that advocates
200
can use if the cities fail to follow the outlined steps.
C.

What Potential Cases Are on the Horizon?

An issue currently of interest to fair-housing advocates in the
Twin Cities involves the trend of setting aside LIHTC dollars and
other federally funded housing resources to support local arts
communities and, more specifically, local artists. On its face, this
would seem to be an appropriate solution to the age-old problem
of arts patronage, especially in a mid-size regional capital like the
Twin Cities without the institutionalized resources available to
artists in, say, New York City or San Francisco. The need is
especially acute in today’s public fiscal conservativism; many of the
resources available to support artists in the past, such as National
Endowment for the Arts grants, have essentially gone away,
especially for those who pursue art with controversial images or
201
themes.
When government funds are made available for this sort of
dedicated housing, however, fair-housing laws still apply and
202
require rental policies to be nondiscriminatory. What’s more,
federal fair-housing laws require communities receiving federal
funds for low-income housing development to take affirmative
203
This includes engaging in
steps to further fair housing.
appropriate and culturally competent affirmative marketing efforts
to ensure diverse tenant populations that mirror the communities
204
around them.
All of this is sharply at odds with the reality of majority-white
tenant populations in local low-income arts housing

200.
201.

Id.
See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts Appropriations History, NAT’L
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/open-government/national
-endowment-arts-appropriations-history (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
202. See Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP), U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN
DEV. http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing
_equal_opp/partners/FHAP (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (“To be eligible for
assistance through the FHAP, a state or local agency must demonstrate to HUD
that it enforces a fair housing law that is substantially equivalent to the federal Fair
Housing Act.”).
203. See HUD Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903).
204. Id.
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205

developments. For example, the Pillsbury A-Mill artist lofts in
Minneapolis were recently completed at a total cost of about $170
million, using around $35 million in affordable housing tax credit
206
proceeds. Billed as “An Artist Community” and marketed as
207
“Artist Lofts! Amazing Location! Art Meets Affordable!”, the AMill Lofts are located close to the newly revitalized Mississippi
Riverfront area adjacent to downtown Minneapolis. Close to local
arts powerhouses such as the Guthrie Theater and the MacPhail
music school, the A-Mill Lofts itself boasts arts amenities such as
208
multiple studios and rehearsal spaces. Years ago, starving artists
who stayed in the Twin Cities would have sacrificed much for this
sort of on-site accessibility. But a quick look at tenant demographics
at the A-Mill Lofts indicates that the population now living there
heavily skews towards white residents (86%, in an urban area where
209
traditional subsidized housing residents are 80% minority) with
210
incomes far above what one would expect in low-income housing.
Many question this use of federal low-income housing funds to
help support local arts communities, arguing that it fails fairhousing criteria and certainly falls short of any goal to affirmatively
211
further fair housing. The countervailing argument is that this
205. See Alana Semuels, The Artist Loft: Affordable Housing (for White People), THE
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05
/affordable-housing-for-white-people/483444/ (quoting Jay Wilkerson of MidMinnesota Legal Aid).
206. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING
17
(2016),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/15/8a
/158a9849bb744b4573b59f51e4f0ab54/IMO-White-Segregated-Subsidized
-Housing-5-18-2016.pdf.
207. See A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com (last visited
Oct. 19, 2016).
208. See About, A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com/about/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
209. Semuels, supra note 205.
210. See Reserve Info, A-MILL ARTIST LOFTS, http://www.a-millartistlofts.com/
reserve-info/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
211. See Editorial Board, Federal Tax Credits Are Misused on Costly Artist Lofts in
Twin Cities, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (June 16, 2016),
http://www.startribune.com/federal-tax-credits-are-misused-on-costly-artist-lofts-in
-twin-cities/383350961/ (“[I]t verges on irresponsible to squander federal housing
tax credits on projects that benefit so few.”); see also Editorial Board, Who Gets the
Subsidized Apartments?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.) (Jul. 5, 2016),
http://www.startribune.com/federal-tax-credits-are-misused-on-costly-artist-lofts-in
-twin-cities/383350961/ (“HUD needs to make sure all subsidized housing—
including artist housing—meets [fair housing] goals.”).

2017]

BLOWING PAST MINNESOTA NICE

99

funding goes to costly historic building renovations and can help
212
high-income neighborhoods become more economically diverse.
The resulting majority-white tenant populations in such housing
developments, however, may indicate potential fair-housing
disparate-impact violations.
Although the IRS has made a special exemption (sought by
Minneapolis developers) for artist housing from the tax credit
requirement that such housing be available for “general public
use,” the fact that so few minorities actually live there raises
discrimination red flags, particularly with regard to how tenant
213
screening procedures are being employed. Moreover, the fact
that this is occurring in a state with such acute income inequality
and persistent housing segregation makes it that much more
suspect as a fair-housing matter. Some note that the use of lowincome tax credits for artist housing may distinguish Minnesota
from the way Texas has been using its federal low-income housing
214
dollars, as challenged in the Inclusive Communities case. Arguably,
a challenge to this method of federal tax credit allocation might
present a stronger case for fair-housing disparate-impact liability
than that which so troubled the Supreme Court in Inclusive
Communities. It should not matter that artist housing funded by
federal low-income tax credit proceeds in Minnesota forms a
comparatively small percentage of subsidized housing
opportunities; what is important are the consequences of diverting
these scarce resources away from needed low-income housing in
the Twin Cities. It is an open question whether the $460 million
spent on just four artist housing developments in Minneapolis and
Saint Paul could have created 6000 units of more typical affordable
215
housing and how much opportunity has consequently been lost
to reduce housing segregation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As housing advocates go about our work, we should bear in
mind that disparate-impact litigation brought under the auspices of
the FHA these days means treading in uncertain waters. Things can

212. See Semuels, supra note 205.
213. See id.
214. Interview, Myron Orfield, Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity,
University of Minnesota Law School, June 28, 2016.
215. Editorial Board, STAR TRIB., supra note 211.
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go awry quickly if careful choices are not made about which cases
to push forward and what resources are used in the process. At the
same time, we cannot pass up chances to assist our clients in
enforcing their right to fair housing by pushing the law forward
when opportunities present themselves.
Disparate-impact litigation around the country, the new HUD
rule, the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, and
recent cases brought here in the Twin Cities have shifted the fairhousing landscape. From the new HUD disparate-impact rule, we
now have a plainly stated, three-part burden-shifting test that
should allow stakeholders to at least start from the same page in
analyzing developments in housing policy, developments in lowincome housing funding, and those developments’ impact on
perpetuating protected class segregation. From the Supreme
Court’s warnings in Inclusive Communities and how that case has
been applied to disparate-impact cases since, as well as the Eighth
Circuit’s treatment of fair-housing disparate-impact cases brought
here in the Midwest in recent years, we can better assess the
litigation prospects of challenging various kinds of housing
development proposals and scenarios.
Going forward, disparate-impact theories of liability will
undoubtedly take a more prominent role in addressing housing
segregation and its attendant racial and income inequality. To be
sure, efforts by local developers to gentrify new rental housing
acquisitions that result in large displacements of tenants belonging
to protected classes, such as is being currently challenged in
Richfield in Crossroads, should be scrutinized by fair-housing
advocates using disparate-impact analysis. The use of federal lowincome housing tax credit funding in artist housing developments,
particularly when such residential populations skew so heavily
towards middle- and high-income whites, should similarly raise fairhousing disparate-impact concerns. The recently clarified burdenshifting test formalized in the HUD disparate-impact rule should
breathe new life into efforts to defeat policies such as criminal
records tenant screening requirements and posting income three
times the rent. Past and developing Eighth Circuit and Supreme
Court jurisprudence increases our understanding of which
scenarios best lend themselves to disparate-impact analysis and
effective fair-housing advocacy.
Meanwhile, the struggle continues to meet the needs of those
most impacted by lack of housing choice and barriers to reducing
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residential segregation. As Prince implores in the lyrics opening
this article, fair-housing advocates must indeed “lend a helping
216
hand” to solve these problems and work together. Advocates can
serve an important role in identifying issues and developments that
contribute, in a systemic manner, to the day-to-day housing
problems experienced by our client communities. Community
organizations and their advocates must do everything possible to
make mechanisms for assessing community input on housing policy
as robust and genuine as possible. The bottom line is that
stakeholders must collaborate effectively with each other to
prioritize what resources to put into play to push change forward in
the most positive and constructive manner possible.
All of this is complicated by the enduring constant of change.
Local, regional, and national economies ebb and flow irrespective
of fair-housing activities and arguably play a larger role in how
217
housing development actually moves forward. Individual families
come and go as they pursue economic and educational
opportunities, regardless of the pace of housing policy
218
development or the evolving insights of fair-housing advocates.
Developments in transportation and communication technologies
219
further impact these migration patterns.
Advocates must accordingly be flexible and skilled enough in
communicating with stakeholders on all sides to anticipate and
effectively deal with these sorts of changes. After all, little of these
underlying economic and social dynamics tends to bear much
relation to the judicial court process. Much of the challenge to fairhousing advocates in coming years will be to sort out what dispute
resolution mechanisms are best employed for the various housing
problems that present themselves. Disparate-impact theories of
liability will accordingly be a useful addition to the legal toolbox for
improving housing conditions and opportunities in the years to
come.

216. PRINCE, supra note 1.
217. See John Muellbauer & Anthony Murphy, Housing Markets and the
Economy: The Assessment, 24 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 1 (2008) (explaining how
the economy impacts the housing market), https://www.wu.ac.at/fileadmin
/wu/d/i/iqv/Gstach/Artikel/Muellbauer_2008.pdf.
218. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, RESEARCH DEP’T, WORKING PAPER
697, UNDERSTANDING THE LONG-RUN DECLINE IN INTERSTATE MIGRATION 5 n.2
(2015), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp697.pdf.
219. Id. at 5.
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